试论克里普克与莱布尼茨在可能个体上的思想差异

A Discussion of the Differences Between Kripke and Leibniz on Possible Individuals

克里普克的模态形而上学思想可追溯至莱布尼茨。但克里普克认为,可能世界中的个体就是指现实世界中的个体,同一个体可以跨世界存在并且在不同的可能世界中可以具有完全不同的性质,甚至是相互矛盾的性质。莱布尼茨则认为可能世界中的个体与现实世界中的个体并不是同一个体,个体与世界是一一对应的,每一个可能个体的概念都包含了关于它的全部真理。正是这种差异造成了今天关于可能世界的形而上学问题上的许多学术争端。

Kripke＇s modal metaphysics is derived from Leibniz. But,Kripke held that the individuals of all possible worlds are the individuals of the actual world,that is,the same one individual has cross- world existence and may have different qualities in different possible worlds even if those qualities may be contradictory to each other. However,Leibniz claimed that the individual of the actual world and its corresponding individuals of the possible worlds can never be the same individual,there is a one- one correspondence between an individual and its world,and every concept of a possible individual contains all of the truths of that individual. It is this difference that brings out many academic disputes over the metaphysics of possible worlds today.