非对称需求突变信息情况下的竞争供应链博弈模型研究

Research on the Game Model of Competitive Supply Chains with Asymmetric Demand and Abrupt Information

通过最优化理论与博弈论的信息机制设计原理,两条竞争供应链的伯特兰德价格竞争博弈模型,研究了竞争供应链有需求扰动发生,且一条链扰动信息共享、另一条链扰动信息不共享的情况下,渠道成员的最优决策问题得到了在不同情况下的均衡解以及鲁棒性的范围,发现供应商的生产计划并不总是随着扰动的发生而改变.

In this paper, based on the theory of optimization, the design principle of information mechanism of the game theory, and the Bertland price competition game model of two competitive supply chains, research on that there is a demand disturbance in the competitive supply chain was carried out. Under the condition that the disturbance information was sharing in one chain, and the disturbance information was not shared in another chain, the equilibrium solu- tion and the range of robustness in different situations were got for the problem of the optimal decision of channel members. It is found that the supplier＇s production plan does not always change with the change of the disturbance.