中国《存款保险条例》中道德风险法律问题析评和完善

On Legal Issues concerning Moral Hazard in the Deposit Insurance Ordinance of China and Improvements

建立存款保险制度的目的是保护存款人和维护金融稳定,但存款保险究竟是降低还是提高了系统性风险,答案不一而足。在存款保险制度存在的情况下,由于约束与激励与存款保险制度紧密联系的各种利益相关者的机制发生了变化,这为与存款保险制度相关的道德风险提供了存在的土壤。如何有效地降低道德风险已经成了各国在设计或完善本国存款保险制度时着重关注的热点和难点问题。于2015年5月生效的《存款保险条例》标志着中国存款保险制度的正式建立。此时,深入研究和分析存款保险制度中道德风险产生的原因、危害以及实践中采取的规制措施,从法律的视角对中国《存款保险条例》中的道德风险进行评析,有助于进一步完善和实施中国的存款保险制度,加速推进利率市场化、民营银行的准入以及商业银行破产法的出台。

The deposit insurance system is designed to protect the depositors＇ interests and maintain the security and stability of the financial system. But looking through various states＇ deposit insurance system, it is difficult to judge whether on earth the deposit insurance reduces or increases the systemic risk. In the case of the deposit insurance system, the mechanism of constraining and stimulating the various stakeholders closely related to the deposit insurance system is changed, and the moral hazard associated with the deposit insurance system occurs. How to effectively reduce the moral hazard has become a hot and difficult issue in the process of designing or improving the deposit insurance system. The Deposit Insurance Act of China took effect on May 2015, which indicates the establishment of the formal deposit insurance SYstem in China. At this point, in-depth study and analysis on the cause that the moral hazard in the deposit insurance system occurs, its harm and how to regulate and supervise it, and evaluation and analysis on the moral hazard in the Deposit Insurance Ordinance of China from the legal perspective, is helpful to further improve and implement China＇s deposit insurance system, and to accelerate the reform of interest rate liberalization, the introduction of private-owned banks and the enactment of Commercial Banks Bankruptcy Law.