宏观调控下中央政府与地方政府的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Central Government and Local Governments under Macroeconomic Control

中央政府与地方政府的关系表现为动态的重复博弈过程,采用演化博弈论方法,可以对宏观调控下中央政府与地方政府的博弈行为进行深入分析。当中央政府的宏观调控政策收益较大,且较易衡量时,不管中央政府是否考虑地方政府利益,地方政府都会执行中央政府决策;当中央政府的宏观调控政策不会给地方政府带来收益,甚至会造成损失时,中央政府应考虑用处罚手段,强制地方政府执行。

The relationship between the central government and local governments appears to be the dynamic process of repeated game. Using the method of evolutionary game theory,we＇ll take a closer look at the game behavior of the central government and local governments under macroeconomic control. If the revenue brought by the macro- control policy of the central government is promising and easier to measure,local governments will implement the central government decisions,even though their benefits are not taken into consideration by the central government; if the central government＇s macro- control policies brings little benefit or even cause loss to local governments,the central government should make local governments implement the policies by means of punishment.