基于供应商道德风险的劳工标准移植研究

RESEARCH ON TRANSPLANT OF LABOR STANDARDS BASED ON SUPPLIER MORAL HAZARD

越来越多的发展中国家企业通过劳工认证获取较多的市场份额,劳工标准移植的问题也受到较多关注。本文选择从供应商道德风险视角研究发展中国家的劳工标准移植的特征。研究发现,风险规避供应商的存在促使采购商必须在道德风险和努力水平之间选择一个次优均衡。尤其是考虑到最低标准等有限责任信息租的存在,使得采购商必须额外支付一定的代理成本以满足委托代理过程,最后的均衡劳工标准比仅考虑逆向选择更加扭曲。

Since many companies get more market shares through labor certification in emerging countries,the issue of labor standards transplants has also been much concerned.This paper analyzes the transplant characteristics of labor standards in developing countries from the perspective of supplier moral hazard.The empirical study shows that the buyers must choose a sub-optimal balance between moral hazard and the level of effort on the presence of risk aversion suppliers.Especially considering the information rent of limited liability which resulted from minimum standards,buyers must pay certain additional agent costs in order to meet the principal-agent progress.The final equilibrium labor standard will be distorted downwards more than when only considering the adverse selection.