电子废弃物许可证制度下闭环供应链网络成员企业行为

Behavior of member firms in closed-loop supply chain network under e-waste permits system

为激励电器电子产品生产企业积极回收并有效处理电子废弃物,电子废弃物许可证管理制度是一种有效的措施.构建多成员企业的闭环供应链网络,分别分析了守约和违约两种情形下的闭环供应链网络成员企业的均衡条件,给出了变分不等式框架,构建了两种情形下的成员企业博弈模型,分析许可证制度下成员企业的行为反应.在此基础上,提出了模型的求解算法,最后提出算例计算并对比分析了两种情形下的博弈模型结果.发现:守约情形下,如果电子废弃物排放许可证初始分配满足环境目标,则政府部门指定的环境标准可以达成;若政府处罚力度不够,成员企业在利润的驱使下会选择超额排放;提高单位处罚成本,成员企业会选择减少违约排放量;违约情形下,建立合理的惩罚框架可以保证成员企业不出现违约行为.

E-waste permits regulation is an effective measure which can encourage firms to recover pos- itively e-wastes. A closed-loop supply chain network including several member firms is developed. The equilibrium conditions of member firms in the network are analyzed in case of compliance and that of noncompliance. The variational inequality framework is given. The game models with compnance ann noncompliance are developed. The behavior responses of the firms are analyzed. Under this basis, a solution algorithm for the model is proposed. Finally, numerical examples are proposed and solve two game models. The equilibrium results of the models are compared and analyzed. We find that environmental standards imposed by the authorities are met if the initial license allocation meets the environmental target, in case of compliance. The member frms will choose excess emissions, driven by profit, if the supervision strengthen of governinent is not enough. The member firms will choose to decrease excess emissions if government increase refit penalty cost. In the case of noncompliance, an appropriate penalty scheme can guarantee that there will be no noncompliant behavior.