等补偿行驶信用券计划管理瓶颈拥挤的效率分析

Efficiency of the reward-equal-charge travel credit scheme for bottleneck congestion

基于瓶颈模型,考虑用户异质性,本文探讨了等补偿行驶信用券(REC)计划对通勤者福利的影响.在这一计划下,选择在高峰期通过瓶颈的通勤者会被收取一定数量的信用券,而选择在非高峰期通过瓶颈的通勤者可以获得一定数量的信用券作为补贴.信用券的价格由市场确定,允许出行者根据自身需求在市场中自由购买或出售信用券.研究结果表明,等补偿行驶信用券计划通过等值地返还信用券给非高峰期出行的通勤者,导致异质用户均衡成本减少而获得收益;与最优行驶信用券计划相比,其效率损失不会超过10%.考虑到该策略的简单性,公平性和有效性,等补偿行驶信用券计划是值得推荐用于实践的.

Based on bottleneck model, this paper aims at exploring the welfare effect of the reward- equal-charge （REC） travel credit scheme on commuters with heterogeneity. Under the REC travel credit scheme, the commuters who pass the bottleneck within the peak-time window to either pay certain units of mobility＂ credits. Those who avoid the peak-time window by traveling outside the peak time window could be rewarded credits. A market will be created to decide the credit price and commuters can buy or sell the credits according to their own travel need. The results show that the REC scheme distributes the benefits across the heterogeneous population due to decreasing commuters＇ equilibrium cost. The REC scheme can guarantee less than 10% efficiency loss compared to the optimal travel credit scheme regardless of the behavioral assumption. Given its simplicity, equity and efficiency, the REC scheme seems to be an ideal choice in practice.