价格反常现象与赢标者策略性行为:基于花卉拍卖的分析

Price Anomaly and Winner's Strategic Behavior: Evidence from Rose Auctions

利用昆明国际花卉拍卖市场(KIFA)的交易数据,分析"荷式"序贯拍卖的价格反常现象,得到了两个重要结论,一个是与Van den Berg等(2001)类似的结论:KIFA存在价格反常现象且价格的强下降发生在剩余数量较少时.另一个是:价格的强下降还发生在序贯拍卖初期.此外,进一步研究赢标者策略性行为对价格趋势的影响,主要从赢标者是否首次赢标、估价、学习次数三个角度加以分析.结果显示:当赢标者为首次赢标时,将减缓价格下降效应;后轮赢标者估价高或学习次数多则分别减缓或加大了价格下降效应,且赢标者估价与学习次数间存在交叉效应.研究表明KIFA的赢标者发现了价格反常现象并采取了策略性行为.

Using data from the rose auctions at the Kunming International Flower Auction（ KIFA）,this study analyzes the price anomaly in sequential Dutch auctions. The empirical results indicate that the strongest decline occurs when only a few units remain,similar to Van den Berg et al. ＇s（ 2001） finding. However,the results also show that strongest decline is early in a lot. We further investigate the strategic behavior of winners,including whether they win the bid for the first time,valuation and learning times. Our empirical results indicate that the declining price anomaly effect would be reduced when the bidder wins a bid for the first time. The bidders in later round with higher valuations or less learning times have negative effects on price decline. Also,there is an interaction effect between valuation and learning times of bidders. The conclusions show that the bidders at KIFA have realized the existence of price anomaly and taken some strategic measures.