技术独立董事能有效抑制真实盈余管理吗?——基于可操控R&D费用视角

Can Technology Independent Directors Constrain Real Earnings Management?——Based on R&D Spending Manipulation

本文基于可操控R&D费用视角,以2007—2013年上市公司为样本,考察了技术独立董事对真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现,技术独立董事通过有效抑制管理层操控R&D费用,以此提高盈余信息质量。在考虑了技术独立董事内生性的影响后,该结论依然成立。进一步研究发现,当技术独立董事具有双重职业背景时,有利于监督职能的发挥;当其兼职公司数量较多时,则会弱化监督作用。此外,技术独立董事的津贴、受教育水平对抑制真实盈余管理并没有显著影响。本文的结论可为我国政府和公司在完善独立董事制度,提高盈余信息质量等方面提供政策建议。

Deriving from the perspective of R&D spending manipulation,this paper finds that the technology independent directors have sufficient technical knowledge to identify opportunistic reductions in R&D. Further analysis shows that if they have multi-background or are at a younger age,they can play supervisory roles more effectively; when they hold concurrent posts,their supervisory power is weakened. The findings of this paper provide policy implications for Chinese government and firms in the construction of independent director system as well as the improvement of accounting earnings information quality.