摘要
传统中国的选官制度在唐代(618—907)完成了向"科举制"的转型。"科举制"下,贵族"门阀"的政治垄断被打破,毫无背景的平民进入统治集团,实现向上的流动,阶层流动性大大增强。通过分析《旧唐书》和《新唐书》的人物列传信息,本文发现这一变革与唐代长期施行的"均田制"紧密相关。"均田制"破坏了"门阀制"的经济基础,使"门阀"衰微,社会结构趋于"扁平化"。社会平民和朝廷都摆脱"门阀"而直接发生政治经济联系,传统中国围绕"科举制"形成新的形态。
What is the specific mechanism through which economic force leads to institutional evolution？ Bureaucracy in the Imperial China changed into the system of Imperial Examination in Tang dynasty （618-907） . Aristocrats could not monopoly political power as before in the system of the Imperial Examination, which increased the mobility of social classes. By analyzing data from biographies in the Former Book of Tang History and the Latter Book of Tang History, the paper argues that the system of Land Equalization was the economic force behind this evolution, and after Tang dynasty, the Imperial China turned into the track of the Imperial Examination, which reshaped the Imperial China.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期53-84,共32页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173161)
教育部新世纪人才支持计划(2010年度)
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(08JJD790141)
美国INET(Institute for New Economic Thinking)研究项目的资助
关键词
科举制
均田制
选官制度
the Imperial Examination, the System of Land Equalization, Bureaucracy
