摘要
本文利用上市公司持股银行数据考察我国企业如何谋求融资便利。本文发现融资约束程度最高的企业持股银行的意愿最强,融资约束程度最低的企业持股银行的意愿最弱;持股非上市银行使企业获得更多外部债务融资,其融资约束得到有效缓解,而持股上市银行并不存在类似效应。本文同时发现持股非上市银行对企业的绩效和盈利能力并没有实质性提升,说明企业出于解决融资困难而进行的持股银行行为可能在一定程度上扭曲了社会资源有效配置。
Using the data of bank ownership holdings by Chinese listed firms, this paper studies how Chinese firms relieve financial constraints. We find that the most financially-con- strained firms are much more willing to hold non-listed bank ownership than those least con- strained firms. By holding non-listed bank ownership, Chinese firms obtain more external debt and financial constraints are effectively eased, while there are no similar effects by holding listed banks. We also find that holding non-listed bank ownership has no significant effects on Chinese firm's performance and profitability, which implies that the holding behavior stemming from financing difficulties may twist the efficiency of social resources allocation.
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期241-262,共22页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
第一作者主持的国家自然科学基金项目(71263008)的资助
关键词
融资约束
负债
持股非上市银行
Financial Constraints, Debt Financing, Holding Non-Listed Bank Ownership