无绩效考核下外部独立董事薪酬的决定

The Determination of Non-performance Related Outside Director Compensation

本文主要研究在没有绩效考虑的情况下,上市公司外部独立董事的薪酬是如何决定的。本文对2005-2014年我国A股上市公司12821个样本的实证检验结果表明,无论是在一定地理范围内、同行业里或一定规模上,上市公司在外部独立董事薪酬决定时均存在显著的"互相看齐"效应,即出现向地理上的中间距离、同一或相关行业或中等规模公司看齐的现象。这既与我们在现实生活中外部独立董事薪酬所观察到的实际现象相吻合,也符合中国传统哲学在利益分配上的中庸思想。

In this article, we examine how the outside director compensation of the listed firms, which is not performance-related, is determined in China. We choose the A-type share listed firms in China during 2005 and 2014 as a study sample. The results of this paper show that there is the ＂envy effect＂ in outside director compensation among geographically approximation firms, same-industries firms and similar-sized firms. In other words, outside director compensation is most catching up with geographically middle firms, middle-sized firms in the same industry or the similar industries. More specifically, we find there is the ＂envy effect＂ in outside director compensation among geographically approximation firms. That is to say the outside director compensation of Chinese listed firms is significantly positively related to the level of outside director compensation of other geographically approximation firms, and when the geographical distance becomes longer, this correlation becomes stronger at first, but turns weaker when the distance is larger than 150 kilometers. This phenomenon means that there is the ＂envy effect＂ in outside director compensation among same-industries firms. Similarly, we find the ＂envy effect＂ exit in outside director compensation among similar-sized firms. That is the more outside directors of other similar-sized firms paid, the more the outside directors of the firm paid. Furthermore we examine the ＂leading-firm effect＂, and the results also show that the outside director compensation of Chinese listed firms is catching up with each other. More specifically, the outside director compensation of the ＂leading firms＂ and the ＂non-leading firms＂ are catching up with each other, but the effect of the ＂leading firms＂ catching up with the ＂non-leading firms＂ is bigger than the effect of the ＂non-leading firms＂ catching up with the ＂leading firms＂, which means the outside director compensation is catching up with the middle ones. Meanwhile, our results are consistent with the reality of Chinese outside director compensation, and also are consistent with the traditional Chinese philosophy in benefit distribution called the golden mean.