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股权激励与企业研发投入——基于PSM的实证分析 被引量:33

Equity incentives and enterprise R&D investment:based on the empirical analysis of PSM
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摘要 文章通过选取沪深两市上市公司相关数据,采用倾向得分匹配(PSM)方法探讨了在不同激励类型和公司实际控制人条件下股权激励对企业研发投入的影响。实证结果显示,在有效控制样本选择偏误的情况下,总体而言股权激励对企业研发投入具有促进作用。进一步对股权激励进行分类可以发现,相比较于股票激励,企业选取期权激励对研发活动的促进效果更为显著。而且在不同实际控制人下,企业研发投入对股权激励的敏感性也存在着显著的差异。对于实际控制人为非国有性质的样本公司而言,股权激励能有效缓解企业所面临的代理问题,使得企业更关注长期业绩,调动企业技术研发的积极性。 This article analyzes the related data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen cities, adopts the Propensity Scores with Matching (PSM) method to discuss the impacts of equity incentives on enterprises' research and development (R&D) under different types of incentives and companies' actual controllers. The empirical result shows that the condition of the effective control of sample selection bias, overall, equity incentives have a vital catalytic role in companies' RSd). Through further classifying equity incentives, it can be found that in comparison with equity incentives, the effect on companies who choosing option incentive seems more significant. And under different actual controllers, the sensitivity of enterprise RSd) investment on the equity incentives exists significant differences. For the actual control of man-made on-state-owned nature of the sample companies, equity incentive can effectively alleviate the enterprises' agency problems, makes enterprises focused on long- term results, and helps enterprises to arouse the enthusiasm of enterprise technology research and development.
出处 《南方经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第4期63-79,共17页 South China Journal of Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金2015年重点项目"同等保护各类资本产权与混合所有制经济健康发展研究"的部分研究成果(批准号:15BJL021)
关键词 股权激励 研发投入 实际控制人 倾向得分匹配 equity incentives R&D investment actual controllers Propensity Scores with Matching (PSM).
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参考文献26

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