银行风险承担、高管薪酬与货币政策的信贷传导效率——基于动态非线性效应面板的实证

Bank Risk-Taking,Senior Executive Compensation,and the Efficiency of Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission: Empirical Research Based on Nonlinear Dynamic Panel Model

货币政策工具与银行高管薪酬水平会通过银行风险承担渠道对货币政策的信贷传导机制效率形成综合影响。笔者利用中国13家上市商业银行2007—2014年的季度财务数据,使用动态非线性效应面板模型,按货币政策工具类别、政策松紧倾向、高管薪酬水平等对上述影响进行了实证检验。结果表明:我国商业银行风险承担与高管薪酬之间呈现正U型非线性关系;在利润空间不受影响的前提下,低薪酬银行的货币政策信贷传导效率相对较高,但当利率下调而利差空间缩小时,高薪酬银行会出于对原有利润的维持而增加风险承担,从而提升货币政策的信贷传导效率。银行风险承担与高管薪酬共同影响下,价格型货币政策工具的信贷传导效率高于数量型货币政策工具。

The monetary policy instrument and senior executive compensation in banking system can make comprehensive influences on credit efficiency though the channel of risk-taking. Based on the category of monetary policy instrument,the tightness of policy orientation,and the level of executive compensation,this paper employs a nonlinear dynamic panel model to examine the credit efficiency of monetary policy transmission,using quarterly data from 13 listed commercial banks in china over the period 2007- 2014. The result shows that there is a U-shape nonlinear relationship between executive compensation and its risk-taking. When the profit space is not affected,the credit efficiency of banks with low compensation is comparatively high. The price monetary policy instruments have relatively higher efficiency than quantitative monetary policy instruments.