摘要
裁量驳回制度源于法律经济学权力配置的理念。从利益衡量的角度,尽管其可提高团体行为和商事审判的效率,但也在一定程度上损害了团体意思的真实性和司法干预的谦抑性。从规范分析的角度,根据《公司法》第22条的适用范围和法律效果,裁量驳回制度在我国现行立法下不具有适用空间;从制度分析的角度,引入裁量驳回制度也不具备制度构建的必要性和可行性。引入裁量驳回制度是对法律经济学权利配置概念的误解,理论界和司法实务界回避法律规定对其径行适用的做法并不妥当。
The discretion to dismiss system derives from the concept of power disposition.Through balancing of interest,although it is used in j uridical practice to improve the efficiency of group behavior and j udgment, it is harmful to restrained judicial involvement and reality of the group intention.Through the normative analysis,according to the applicable scope and the legal effect of the Article 22 of Chinese Company Law, the discretion to dismiss can not be applicable.Also,through the system analysis,the discretion to dismiss is not necessary and feasible.The view of adopting the discretion to dismiss system is a misunderstanding to the allocation of rights.It is improper for scholars and practitioners to ignore the laws and apply the system directly.
出处
《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期296-301,共6页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
基金
中国政法大学博士研究生创新实践资助项目(2015BSCX11)
关键词
程序瑕疵
裁量驳回制度
股东会决议
procedural defect
discretion to dismiss system
the resolution of shareholder meeting