摘要
本文从产业政策视角研究转型时期我国产能过剩的发生机制。研究认为,当前产业政策刺激了大量的企业对少数具有政府偏好产业的集中进入,而企业自身的投资冲动行为又进一步加强了产能过剩程度。过剩产能形成后,地方政府出于经济发展、社会稳定等宏观目标的考量往往会在产业政策指导下采取一系列举措促进去库存、鼓励创新、限制退出,这种选择性的疏导策略又在客观上造成产能过剩化解机制受阻,从而使得产能过剩"日益严重",且"久治不愈"。进一步地,本文利用1999—2013年制造业行业面板数据对此进行实证检验,其政策意义在于有效防范和治理产能过剩,为加快产业政策转型提供思路。
This article studies the mechanism of China' s excess capacity during the transition period from the perspective of industrial policy. It suggest that the current industrial policy which has the characteristics of government to choose the "winner " and "loser" stimulate a large number of enterprises enter same industry with government preference,and enterprise' s investment impulsive further aggravate the degree of excess capacity. After the formation of excess capacity,local governments will adopt a series of measures to promote to inventory,encourage innovation and limit exit under the guidance of industrial policy for same macroscopic objects such as economic development,social stability and so on.The selective strategy will make the surplus "growing ",and "cured". Further,empirical study found that industrial policy has a significantly negative effect on capacity utilization,and cause excess capacity from two channels. It suggest that government must speed up the transformation of industrial policy to effectively prevent and control excess capacity.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期52-62,共11页
Finance & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目"国有企业改革和制度创新研究"(项目编号:15ZDA026)
国家自然科学基金面上项目"竞争性国有企业混合所有制改革"(项目编号:71472186)
江苏省社会科学基金项目"增创更具活力
更有效率的江苏改革开放新优势研究"(项目编号:13WTB021)
关键词
产业政策
产能过剩
发生机制
制造业
Industrial Policy
Overproduction
Mechanism
Manufacturing