企业社会责任能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于强制披露企业社会责任报告准实验

Can Corporate Social Responsibility Inhibit Earnings Management?——A Quasi-Experiment of the Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility Report

具有负责任声誉的企业一定会做出负责任的行为吗?本文以2006-2013年沪、深A股上市公司为样本,研究强制披露企业社会责任报告对盈余管理的影响。研究发现:强制披露企业社会责任报告与操纵性应计利润显著负相关,说明企业承担社会责任后显著地减少了操纵性应计,提高了会计信息质量。同时,强制披露企业社会责任报告对真实盈余管理,特别是操纵性酌量费用,存在显著抑制作用。由于业绩好坏会影响企业盈余管理动机,本文进一步分析企业业绩对强制披露企业社会责任与操纵性应计、真实盈余管理关系的调节作用。区分不同盈利状况,我们发现强制披露企业社会责任对应计项目和真实盈余管理的抑制作用主要集中在盈利较差的样本组,声誉机制在高风险公司效果更为显著。考虑机构投资者和分析师监督作用、随机效应和关键变量测量误差影响后,声誉责任的监督作用依旧存在。

Whether firms taking corporate social responsible activities will behavior responsibly in other corporate decisions.＇？ The regulation on mandatorily disclosure of corporate social responsibility report provides a good quasiexperience to study this research question. This paper tests the impact of mandatorily disclosure of corporate social responsibihty report on accrual and real earnings management using the samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2006 to 2013. We find that whether mandatorily disclosure corporate social responsibility report is negatively related to discretionary accrual. Meanwhile, mandatorily disclosure corporate social responsibility report can decrease real earnings management, especially discretional expense. These results suggest that mandatorily disclosure corporate social responsibility report can generate ＂reputation responsible＂ effect, which can monitor firms＇ earnings management and improve the quality of accounting information. Considering that firms with badperformanee have larger motivation to do earnings management. We further examine whether the monitor effect is different between good performance frms and bad performance finns. When the sample is distinguished by proftability, we fnd the inhibit effect of mandatorily disclosure is significant in lower profitable firms, but not significant in higher profitable firms. This result suggests that the monitor effect of reputation is larger when firms have more motivation to behave irresponsibly. After considering the influence of institutional ownership, analyst, random effect and measurement errors, the reputation responsible effect is still holding.