摘要
在平津战役中,中共方面一直担心北平和天津地区国军南下华东,由此在1948年12月11日做出"围而不打""隔而不围"的针对性部署,随后又推迟发动绥远战役,放弃进攻塘沽和大沽。事实上,傅作义虽有撤军打算,却从未考虑南下,早于12月5日将中央军和嫡系主力分别集中于北平、张家口,这是权衡利弊之后的慎重之举——抑留中央军与中共和谈的同时,做好和谈破裂后嫡系部队撤往绥远的打算。中共军事部署与平津国军没有南下之间并非因果关系。
During the Peiping-Tientsin Campaign,Mao Zedong made the 'surround but not attack'、'break up but not surround'plan on December 11,1948,delayed the Suiyuan Campaign and gave up the plan of attacking Tanggu and Dagu,which prevented the Central Army in Peiping and Tianjin retreat southwards. In fact,Fu Zuo-yi never tempted to withdraw. On December 5,he deployed the Central Army and his own troops in Peiping and Zhangjiakou respectively. It wasn't a causal link between the military deployment of the CPC and the objective outcome of the Central Army in Peiping and Tientsin.
出处
《史林》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期158-169,221-222,共12页
Historical Review