异质性劳动力与岗位的匹配研究:基于纳什均衡对我国失业与用工荒问题的解读

Heterogeneous Labor and Vacancy Matching:Nash Equilibria-based analysis on the dilemma of unemployment and labor shortage

本文对DMP模型进行拓展,利用动态规划和纳什博弈研究两个分割的劳动力市场的均衡失业流,并通过教育成本内生化使劳动力在市场之间流动。结论认为,由于教育成本和预期收入不同,在当前的人力资本结构和经济结构下异质性劳动力失业的风险有所不同。若劳动者讨价还价的能力较低,高学历劳动力失业的风险低于低学历劳动力,社会可能出现普遍性失业;若劳动者博弈能力较高,高学历劳动力失业的风险高,社会出现"技工荒"。并且高校毕业生的扩大可能导致高学历的失业问题扩大。这正是我国劳动力市场的困境,反映了我国经济发展结构和劳动力技能结构之间的矛盾。

Labor shortage continues to be a major problem after the Impact of financial crisis on China. China is facing the dilemma of unemployment and labor shortage. However, previous studies about unemployment rarely use the theory of searching and matching under the hypothesis of heterogeneous labor. After reviewing literatures, this paper uses extended DMP model to deduce the equilibrium employment flow of segmented labor market. The results of dynamic programming and Nash bargaining prove that heterogeneous labor has different employment values under the existing structure system of human resource and economy. Based on the survey data since 2000 in China, calibration analysis method shows that if job-hunters＇ wage bargaining power is weak the value of well-educated unemployment group is lower than that of poorly educated group. This can result in massive job losing. On the contrary, if the bargaining power and value of well-educated unemployment group is higher the phenomenon of ＂Lack of Technicians＂ will increase. In addition, expanded scale of college graduates would worsen the unemployment problem. These reasons cause the contradiction between economic development structure and skill structure of heterogeneous labor.This paper provides new evidence to analyze Chinese macroeconomic issues from micro perspective. It is structured in five parts. Section 1 briefly discusses the relevant literature and introduction. Based on the theory of standard DMP model, section 1 relaxes the assumption of labor homogeneity and single labor market. In addition, we assume that unskilled labor flows between two labor markets by making training cost endogenous. Based on these assumptions, this part theoretically analyzes the impacts on unemployment flows from labor quantity, technical ability and power of players in game. Section 2 uses calibration method to prove the negative effect on employment from power of players with some tables and figures. The study shows that decreasing the proportion of poorly educated labor would reduce unemployment but the disability in creating jobs would result in structural unemployment for highly educated labor. Section 3 conducts a survive analysis of Chinese labor market data. Our analysis results confirm that the mismatch between job hunters and vacancy jobs is the result of interactions between power of players in game and incomplete wage system. The contradiction between human capital structure and economic structure is one of essential reasons. Studying the problems of searching and matching between labor and vacancy job provide us some suggestions for resolving unemployment issues in China. Employment is the result of dynamic matching between job hunters and jobs. Increasing the percentage of skilled labor or creating jobs alone does not necessarily lead to lowered unemployment rate.