参照点效应、公平偏好和“龙头企业+农户”供应链关系治理

Reference Point Effect, Fairness Preference and the Relational Governance on the Supply Chain of “Leading Agricultural Enterprises +Farmers”

针对龙头企业和农户间存在的现实冲突,引入参照点效应,将龙头企业收益作为农户公平偏好的现状参照点,而将双方Nash谈判解作为非现状参照点,通过构建双方交易的Stackelberg博弈模型,考察农户公平偏好对农产品供应链运作造成的偏差。研究结果表明:农户的公平偏好显著影响了双方的博弈均衡结果,同时依赖于不同参照点将使得生产质量水平、收购价格、农户效用、龙头企业效用以及供应链整体效用的变化更加复杂。论文证明了农户依赖于现状参照点的公平偏好可以提高供应链整体效用,而依赖于非现状参照点的公平偏好却会降低供应链整体效用。

A great deal of research has confirmed that fairness preference has influence on one＇s decision making. In this thesis, we innovatively incorporate the fairness preference into the Chinese leading agricultural ‘enterprises ＋ farmers＇ mode. Farmers are divided into two types： non-fairness and fairness. Furthermore, we investigate the mechanism through which farmers choose their fairness reference point under the assumption that farmers with fairness preference regard Nash bargaining solution as their reference point. This study attempts to explain the deviation caused by farmers＇ fairness in the ‘enterprises ＋farmers＇ system.In this thesis, we mainly construct the Stackelberg Game models in two different cases according to whether farmer has fairness preference or not. On the basis of the reality, we assume that a leading agricultural enterprise is the leader who will make decision on the wholesale price and the farmer as the follower determines the level of quality according to the wholesale price. The results confirm that farmer‘s fairness preference affects equilibrium outcomes greatly. The whole supply chain becomes complicated because of different preference point, the changes of product quality, purchase price, the utilities of farmer, leading agricultural enterprise. When confronting with wholesale price at the same level, farmers will lower the quality of products due to their fairness preference. In order to encourage farmers to provide high quality, leading enterprises have to offer high wholesale price. The whole supply chain utility is maximal when farmer＇s fairness is based on status quo of the reference point. In addition, the whole supply chain utility is the second when farmer is non-fairness. Supply chain utility is minimum when farmer＇s fairness is based on non-status quo of reference point. These results verify that farmer＇s fairness preference makes it possible to achieve fair trades and improve the whole utilities of the supply chain. It is necessary to confront the impact of fairness on the agri-supply chain system for the reasons that（1） fairness preference will have significant effect on the equilibrium outcomes, and（2） the fairness preference exists as an inherent social behavior of farmers. By establishing mutual beneficial and across-organizational cooperation mechanisms, more equal bargaining power is possible and a win-win relationship can be realized.