排放税与排放标准的经济效率分析

Study on Economic Efficiencies of Emission Taxes and Emission Standards

污染问题是当前世界关注的焦点,很多国家和地区已采用减排政策来控制污染排放。鉴于不同减排政策的使用效果不同,有必要对不同减排政策进行深入研究,从而为减排政策的制定与实施提供理论依据和政策参考。采用博弈论的研究思想,运用最优规划的方法,从微观角度研究排放税和排放标准的经济效率,并对排放税与减排标准进行比较分析,提出在实现经济最优时,最优排放税和减排标准的实施条件。研究表明:排放税具有"抑制产出效应",而排放标准却有"产出补贴效应"。在完全竞争市场中,排放税是有效率的,是最优减排政策,而排放标准存在效率损失,是次优减排政策。在不完全竞争市场中,排放税有效率损失,是次优减排政策,而排放标准是有效率的,是最优减排政策。由于现实经济几乎不存在完全竞争市场,所以,排放标准的经济效率要优于排放税。无论在何种经济状态下,排放税与产出补贴的政策组合、排放标准与消费税的政策组合,均可使经济达到最优状态,是最优减排政策。

The pollution problem is the current focus of attention of the world, so many countries and regions have adopted policies to control pollutions. In view ＇of different effects of reduction policies, it is necessary to conduct in - depth study of different emission-reduction policies, so as to proVide theoretical basis and references for the implementation~ of emission-reduction policies. This paper applies game theory and optimal planning method to study economic efficiencies of emission taxes and emission standards from the microscopic point of view, and put forward implementation conditions of optimal emission taxes and emission standards in first-best setting through comparative analysis. Conclusions are drawn as follows： emission taxes have a ＂restrained output effect＂, and emission standards have an ＂Output subsidy effect＂. In the perfect competition, the emission taxes are efficient, while the emission standards are in the loss Of efficiency. In the imperfect competition, emission taxes are in the loss of efficiency, but emission standards are effective. Because imperfect competition does not exist in reality, as the economic efficiency is concerned, emission standards are superior to emission taxes. No matter what the state of the economy, emission taxes combined with output subsidies and emission standards combined with consumption taxes, can make the economy reach the optimum, which are the optimal reduction policies.