我国近海捕捞业中的利益博弈研究

Game research of interest in offshore fishing industry of China

文章首先界定了我国近海捕捞业中的三个利益相关者——中央政府、地方政府和捕捞者；其次对各利益相关者之间的博弈分别进行了分析，认为中央政府与地方政府之间存在委托代理关系，它们的博弈形式是有限次重复博弈，地方政府与捕捞者之间的博弈是不完全信息动态博弈并存在混合战略纳什均衡，而捕捞者之间博弈则类似于“公地悲剧”；最后，基于利益协调思想对各个利益相关者分别提出了近海渔业资源保护的相应措施，为我国近海渔业资源可持续利用制度的完善提供科学依据。

The paper first defined the three stakeholders of offshore fishing industry-central government, local government and fishers; Secondly, the article analyzed the interest conflicts among these stakeholders through game theory, which came out three game models, such as finitely repeated games, dynamic game of incomplete information, Tragedy of the commons; Finally, basing on the interests of coordinating ideas, the paper put forward countermeasures for every stakeholders to protect offshore fishery resources, which provide a scientific reference to the research on sustainable utilization of offshore fishery resources.