控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究

Is Controlling Shareholder's Share Pledge a Potential “Mine”?

控股股东股权质押虽然缓解了控股股东的融资约束,但一旦股价触碰平仓警戒线,被质权方抛售,股票将面临极大的股价崩盘风险和控制权转移风险,故股权质押犹如一颗潜在的"地雷"。那么,控股股东股权质押后,主要利益相关方是否会着力排除这一"地雷"险情呢?本文对此进行了研究,结果发现,控股股东股权质押公司的股价崩盘风险更低;在非国有控股上市公司中,控股股东股权质押与股价崩盘风险负相关的关系更强。我们进一步还发现,控股股东并不是通过努力提高经营业绩来降低股权质押期间内股价崩盘风险程度;控股股东的股权质押解除后,公司的股价崩盘风险随之提高。本文的发现意味着,控股股东股权质押后,主要利益相关方确实采取了行动去排除股权质押的"地雷"险情,降低了股价崩盘风险,但这只是其股权质押期间机会主义的权宜之计。

Although the controlling shareholder's share pledge could satisfy his cash needs, the controlling shareholder has to face stock price crash risk and control rights transfer risk when the stock price touches the cordon of liquidation and the pledged shares will be closed out by pledgee. Consequently, share pledge is just like a dangerous' mine 'to the controlling shareholder and his firm. Thus, if the controlling shareholder 's shares are pledged, will the controlling shareholder strive to' demine '? In this paper, we find that: Compared with firms without shares pledge by controlling shareholder, firms whose shares used to be collaterals have less share price crash risk. This negative relation is much stronger in privately-owned firms. Our further study documents that the main method used by the controlling shareholder to decrease share price crash risk is not improving financial performance, and share price crash risk rises subsequent to the termination of share pledge. These results suggest that the controlling shareholders do take actions to reduce risk regarding share pledge, but these actions are opportunistic makeshift.