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用户迁移、单边锁定与市场进入 被引量:8

User Migration,One Side Lock-In and Market Entry
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摘要 双边市场的特性决定了平台厂商进入新市场的过程也就是如何获得用户基础的过程,这导致了双边市场中新型进入方式的出现。本文对"用户迁移"和"单边锁定"这两种双边市场中的新型进入方式进行了研究,前者可以使平台厂商在短时间内实现生存必需的最低网络规模;后者则能够首先保证平台一边用户的稳定,然后以交叉网络外部性吸引另一边用户加入平台。两种进入方式均以用户获得为核心,能够提高成功进入的可能性,并通过提高产品差异等途径提高市场绩效。稳定的用户基础不仅是平台厂商现有市场势力的主导因素,也决定了平台厂商向其他市场扩张的能力。 The characteristics of the two-sided markets have decided the process of entering new markets by platform manufacturers to be also the process of capturing the user base,which leads to the emergence of new entry methods into the two-sided markets.This paper studies two types of new entry methods,namely "user migration"and "one side lock-in".The former can make the platform manufacturers realize the minimum network size in a short time which is necessary for their survival;while the later can firstly guarantee the stability of the users on one side,then attract the users in the other side with the externalities of crossover network.Both methods are focused on the user capture,which can increase the possibility of successful entry and then improve their market performance by increasing product differences and so on.A stable user base not only is the leading factor of the existing market power of platform manufacturers,but also determines their abilities to expand into other markets.
作者 鲁彦 曲创
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期98-107,共10页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"平台垄断 用户迁移与中国支付市场效率研究"(15YJA790050)
关键词 双边市场 用户迁移 单边锁定 市场进入 two-sided market user migration one side lock-in market entry
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参考文献18

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