中央银行比较研究的政治经济学分析

Political Economy and Comparative Central Banking

本文介绍了对中央银行比较研究进行政治经济学分析的一个马克思—凯恩斯—卡莱斯基模型。该模型表明货币政策由如下四个关键因素所决定:资本—劳动关系、产业资本—金融资本关系、中央银行独立性程度以及该经济体在世界经济中的地位。本文提供的计量经济学证据表明,在经济合作与发展组织(OECD)国家中,具有更多独立性的中央银行、更多投机性的金融市场和对抗性更强的资本—劳动关系的大国,会具有更低的产能利用率。这一证据与本文的模型对政治—经济结构和中央银行政策之间的关系的预测是一致的。

This paper introduces a Marx-Keynes-Kalecki model of the political economy of comparative central banking which suggests that monetary policy is determined by four key factors：capital-labor relations;industry-finance relations;the degree of central bank independence;and the position of the economy in the world economy.The paper presents econometric evidence suggesting that large OECD countries that have more independent central banks,more speculative financial markets,and more conflictual capital-labor relations,have lower rates of capacity utilization.This evidence is consistent with the model＇s predictions about the relationship between political-economic structure and central bank policy.