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WTO“免费通行”现象研究 被引量:3

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摘要 WTO主要创新之一是其对违反的制裁反应。在实践中,由于WTO救济不具有回溯性,以及违反与不遵守裁决及授权实施反措施之间存在时间迟延,违约方可很方便或机会主义地长时间收获不遵守的利益而不必面对任何后果。这个救济缺口使被申诉方没有理由在司法程序结束前解决争端,并可能导致受挫的申诉方在法律框架之外行动而破坏争端解决机制。但是,WTO救济中"免费通行"的制度根源在于其允许某一成员"逃避"WTO纪律,只要其愿意在可能的报复方面付出"代价"。照此,弱救济有助于促进体现WTO整体效用的有效违约,为政治输入提供重要的空间和为行使国家主权提供更多机会。在WTO诉讼中最有经验的当事方可将救济缺口当成剑和盾牌,并成为其最大的受益方和最小受害者。
作者 韩逸畴
出处 《当代法学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期138-148,共11页 Contemporary Law Review
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参考文献45

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二级参考文献35

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