基于演化博弈的产学研协同创新机制研究

为了探讨产学研协同创新过程的演化并揭示参与者策略行为的影响因素,在有限理性假设基础上,构建了产学研协同创新的演化博弈模型,对单群体和两群体系统的演化稳定性进行了分析。理论分析和数值实验结果表明:双方进行协同创新的概率与协同超额收益正相关、与投入总成本和背叛收益负相关;存在一个最优的超额收益分配系数,使得产学研双方进行协同创新的可能性最大化;合理的惩罚和奖励机制将有效减少双方的背叛行为。

In order to study the evolution of process of Industry-University-Research collaborative innovation and reveal the influenc- ing factors of the players＂ strategic behavior, this paper develops an evolutionary game model under the assumption of the player＇s bounded rationality and analyzes the evolutionary stability of one-population and two-population systems. Theo- retical analysis and numerical examples show that the probability of collaborative innovation of both sides has a positive correlation with excess income of collaboration and a negative correlation with total cost of investment and betrayal income. There exists an optimal allocation proportion of excess income which can maximize the probability of collaboration. In ad- dition, the reasonable punishment and reward would effectively reduce the betrayal behavior of both sides.