内控缺陷信息披露、动机选择与经济后果

Internal Control Deficiencies Disclosure,Motivated Selectivity and Economic Consequences

以沪市上市公司2010-2012年存在违规行为、存在财务报表重述、受到证监会处罚、注册会计师对公司财务报表发布非标审计意见为基础,确定存在内部控制重大缺陷的上市公司样本,并在此基础上依据是否如实披露存在的内部控制重大缺陷信息,对公司管理层"动机选择"行为的经济后果进行了实证研究。研究发现,上市公司越倾向于隐瞒已经存在的内控重大缺陷,其权益资本成本越高,债务资本成本越高,企业价值越低。研究表明,内控信息披露是解决代理问题的有效手段,管理层越规范"动机选择"的机会主义行为,如实披露已经存在的内控重大缺陷,外部资本市场越能够得到良好的市场反应。

Based on the companies during the 2010 -2012 in Shanghai trading market which exist the irregular- ities, financial restatements, the punishments and the non - standard audit opinions to determine the existence of internal control significant deficiencies in the sample listed companies, this paper analyzes the empirical research on the economic consequences of the management motivated selectivity. The motivated selectivity is based on the view of whether management truthfully announces the existed internal control material weaknesses. It finds out that the management is more likely inclined to conceal the existed internal control material weaknesses, the higher the cost of equity capital is, the higher the cost of debt capital is, the lower the value of the enterprise is. This paper not only shows that internal control information disclosure is an effective means to solve the agency problem but also provides that the management chooses to decrease the motivated selectivity.