考虑零售商公平偏好的两级供应链收益共享契约机制研究

Study on Revenue Sharing Contract Mechanism Considering Retailer's Fairness Preference in Two-echelon Supply Chain

在收益共享契约模型中加入零售商的公平偏好行为,将制造商和零售商的决策分为制造商考虑零售商的公平偏好行为和制造商不考虑零售商的公平偏好行为两种情形,分别研究了不同情形下收益共享契约的协调性以及零售商公平偏好对收益共享契约机制协调性的影响。结果表明:零售商公平偏好对收益共享契约协调性的影响在于其影响收益共享契约被接受的条件;当零售商的公平偏好程度较低时,收益共享契约机制可以实现渠道的完美共赢协调;当零售商的公平偏好程度达到一定值时,收益共享契约机制的协调性将会失效。此外,当收益共享契约对制造商考虑和不考虑零售商公平偏好的两种情形均可以实现渠道的完美共赢协调时,制造商考虑零售商的公平偏好有利于其自身获得更多的新增利润。

In this paper, the fairness preference was introduced into the model of revenue sharing contract. Two different revenue sharing contract models were constructed under two different situations in which the manufacturer considers retailer＇s fairness preference or regardless of retailer＇s fairness preference. The behavior of manufacturer and retailer was analyzed ; the coordination effect of revenue sharing contract in two different situations and the influence of the fairness preference of retail- er on the coordination effect of revenue sharing contract were discussed. The results show that the impact of the fairness preference of retailer on the coordination effect of revenue sharing contract lies in it influence the condition that the contract was accepted. In addition, when the degree of the preference is low, the contract can realize channel win-win coordination; however, when the degree reached a certain threshold, the coordination will be invalid, At the same time, when the contract can realize channel coordination in the two different conditions, manufacturer considers retailer＇s preference to participate in the game was in favor of improving his new profit.