规模不经济下信息分享对制造商渠道选择的影响

The Effect of Forecast Information Sharing on Supplier's Launching Direct Channel with Production Diseconomies

研究了零售商信息分享是如何影响制造商渠道结构选择的。考虑了制造商生产成本为线性和非线性两种情形。研究发现:无论制造商成本如何,零售商都没有动机将其市场预测信息与制造商分享。在零售商不分享其市场预测信息情形下,尽管制造商倾向于开通网络直销渠道,但是直销渠道是否侵蚀零售利润由零售商市场信息预测精准度和制造商规模不经济程度决定。此外,设计了Nash信息补偿机制使得零售商自愿与制造商分享其市场预测信息以实现供应链帕累托最优。

Based on a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier,the effect of forecast information sharing on supplier＇ s launching direct channel with production diseconomies is studied. It shows the optional decisions of the supplier and the retailer when the cost of supplier is linear and non-linear. Findings：the retailer has no incentives to share its forecast information with the supplier. Even though the supplier always launches the direct channel without retailer＇s forecast information with production diseconomies, the retailer can benefit from online direct channel. （1）The retailer suffers from the small production diseconomies; （2）the retailer suffers from the more accurate forecast information and the large production diseconomies; and（3）the retailer benefits from the less accurate forecast information and the large production diseconomies. Furthermore, the Nash information sharing compensation mechanism is built to secure Pareto improvements for the retailer and the supplier.