契约显性激励与声誉隐性激励的比较研究——以建筑承包商为例

Research on Contract's Explicit Incentive and Reputation's Implicit Incentive Mechanism towards Construction Contators

工程质量体现着建筑承包商对业主和社会的信誉与责任,由于承包商掌握更多在建工程项目的相关信息,而业主和公众处于信息弱势的状态,信息的不对称可能导致承包商为追求自身利益而做出不利于业主的行为。因此,建立有效的激励机制是保障投资者经济利益和工程项目用户财产与生命安全的关键。基于委托-代理理论和博弈论,建立相关数学模型,分析比较了建筑承包商作为代理人,在与委托人签订契约的显性激励与市场声誉的隐性激励下的效用函数,得到有效激励实现的条件和提高激励效应的途径,指出声誉的隐性激励与契约的显性激励机制相结合作用的合理性与优越性,对如何有效地建立委托-代理关系下建筑承包商的激励机制提出对策建议。

The quality of construction projects reflects the credit and responsibilities of construction contractors for the owners and the whole society. Since the construction contractors own more relevant information about the entrusted engineering project under construction while the owners and public are in unfavorable position of gaining information,asymmetric information may lead the contractors act against the owners in order to pursue their own interests. Thus building an effective motivation mechanism is the key to guarantee investors＇ economic interests and the life and property safety of users of construction projects. Based on principal-agent theory and game theory, this article develops corresponding mathematical models to analyze and compare representative construction contractors＇ utility functions under different combinations of principles and agents＇ contracts＇ explicit incentive mechanism and market reputation＇s implicit incentive mechanism, aiming at finding out the conditions for incentive validity. This research concludes that the most rational and effective motivation way is to combine the explicit and implicit incentive effects of both contracts and reputation mechanism, and puts forth some measures for improving incentive mechanism towards construction contractors on account of China＇s current situation.