摘要
公司收购中控制权的更替,引发了目标公司董事与公司及各方利益主体之间的天然利益分歧,公司收购中目标公司董事的决定性地位,使董事义务深刻影响着公司收购正当价值的实现。目标公司董事的控制权愈强,其与公司的利益分歧以及由此引发的代理成本问题也就更加突出。利益分歧行为可以分为积极的利益冲突和消极的利益背离,并建议将忠实义务与注意义务结合起来综合进行判断,通过对目标公司董事的权力限制,以实现对利益分歧的救济。
Replacement of control right in corporate takeover causes the diversification of natural interests between target directors,and the target company and its shareholders and stakeholders.Because of the decisive status of target directors in corporate takeover,directors' duties have a profound impact on the realization of the legitimate value in corporate takeover. This article starts with the reasons of the diversification of interests,and considers that corporate control is a matter of fact;as the consequence the stronger of control of the directors of the target company,the resulting agency cost problem also is more prominent.Through the analysis on the theory of diversification of interests in corporate takeover,this article divides the acts of the diversification of interests into positive interest conflicts and negative interest divergence,and proposes to combine the duty of loyalty and duty of care to judge and restrict the power of the directors of the target company.
出处
《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期57-63,130,共7页
Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
中国政法大学校级(人文社会科学)规划项目<非营利性组织发展的路径选择--我国社会企业创立的必要性>(批准号:14ZFG82007)
中国政法大学青年教师学术创新团队资助项目<中国民法典的根基与周边>(批准号:2014CXTD05)
中国政法大学优秀中青年教师培养支持计划资助项目资助
关键词
控制权争夺
利益分歧
董事义务
battle for corporate control
diversification of interests
directors' duties