完全信息博弈论在OPEC产量配额机制中的分析应用

The Application of Complete Information Game Theory in the Production Quotas Mechanism of OPEC

OPEC本质上是一个石油卡特尔,在国际石油市场具有较强的控制力。产量配额机制是该组织维护集团利益的重要手段,然而其实施却需要集团内部成员的多边合作。历次石油出口,对OPEC各成员国而言都是一次产量博弈;因此,本文在非合作博弈论的框架下构建了完全信息静态博弈模型与完全信息动态博弈模型,对OPEC内部各成员国之间的产量博弈行为进行分析。研究表明,单次产量博弈下,各成员国无可避免落入"囚徒困境",打破产量配额。然而当出口博弈进行多次,并且博弈结束时间不可知,成员国之间的合作成为可能,个体理性与集体理性的冲突得以解决。

As a petroleum Cartel, OPEC has great influence on the international oil market. Based on multilateral cooperation of its member countries, OPEC utilizes the production quotas mechanism to maintain its monopoly profits. Every oil export is a production game for its member countries. Based on Non-Cooperative Game Theory frame, this paper established a complete information game theory model to study the production game behavior of OPEC members. The research indicated that, under the circumstance of one time production game, every member country will inevitably fall into prisoner’s dilemma and violate the production quotas agreement. However, when the game will do many times and no member country knows the end time, the cooperation between every member become possible; and that’s the end of the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality.