政府多策略干预下不同回收模式闭环供应链协调研究

Study on Coordination of Closed-loop Supply Chains with Different Recycling Modes under Government Multi-strategy Intervention

为分析不同回收模式下政府干预对闭环供应链成员决策和利润的影响,采用Stackelberg博弈法,分别构建政府多策略干预下制造商和零售商为回收主体的两种闭环供应链协调模型,并对比分析分散决策和联合决策情形下政府补贴和碳税干预策略对两种模式回收主体、其他供应链参与企业和社会总福利的影响。研究算例分析表明,分散决策下,两种回收模式中,零售商为回收主体下社会总福利更高;联合决策下,社会总福利较分散决策时有很大提高。

In this paper, in order to analyze the influence of government intervention on the decision-making and profit of members of a closed- loop supply chain with different recycling modes, we used the Stackelberg game method to build two closed- loop supply chain coordination models under the multi- strategy intervention of the government where the manufacturer and the retailer were the major recycling party respectively and then compared the influence of government subsidization and carbon tax intervention strategy on the benefits of the recycling party, other supply chain members and the society as a whole in the two modes respectively under the distributive decisionmaking and joint decision-making scenarios. Through which, we found that, when the decision was made individually, in both recycling modes, the total social benefits would be higher when the retailer was the major recycling party; and the total social benefits would be much higher in the joint decision-making scenario than otherwise.