教师有偿补习为何屡禁不止:从委托代理理论的视角分析政府监管的困境

Why Repeated Bans on Teacher's Private Tutoring Always Fail:A Principal-agent Analysis of the Government's Regulatory Dilemma

本文着眼于在职教师有偿补习屡禁不止这一热点现象,从委托代理理论的视角探究其内在原因,分析教师行为策略和政府面临的监管掣肘。本文发现,当教师群体分为高声誉教师和低声誉教师时,高声誉教师的有偿补习能带来教师、学生双方的效用提升和社会总福利的增加;低声誉教师强迫式有偿补习会降低学生效用,损坏社会总福利。政府监管面临财政支出约束和教师参与约束两大限制条件。当公立学校为教师的唯一雇佣方时,政府可采取"低监管频率+高违规成本"的监管方式,在满足财政支出的条件下以极低监管成本实现对有偿补课的有效控制。一旦存在私人教育部门,高声誉教师参与约束发生变化,政府无法在同时满足财政支出约束、教师参与约束的前提下实现对有偿补课行为的有效监管,强行实施监管将产生明显的挤出效应,高声誉教师会离开公共部门投身私人部门。政府只能以放松监管的方式给予教师非金钱激励以增加公共部门的吸引力,防止教师从公共部门流向私人部门。本文的研究思路为有偿补课监管失效现象提供了一个分析框架,也为普遍存在的监管失灵提供了新的解读视角。

By focusing on the failures of repeated regulations on paid tutoring of in-service teachers, this paper analyzes the behavioral strategies of teachers and the constraints of government＇s regulation based on the principal-agent theory. When teachers are divided in terms of prestige, the private tutoring behavior of prestigious ones could indeed produce effectiveness and welfare for both teachers and students. The less-prestigious ones, on the other hand, cause more harm than benefits. The findings indicate that the two main constraints facing the government include financial constraint and individual rationality constraint （IC）. When the public sector is the sole employer of teachers, the government could control teachers＇ paid private tutoring behavior effectively through a low cost monitor strategy including low monitor frequency but high expense for breaking the rules. Yet, given the existence of the private sector leading to the change of teacher＇ s IC, the government could not control teachers＇ paid private tutoring meanwhile satisfying financial constraint. In this case, the government could prevent teachers from draining to the private sector through deregulation, which acts as a welfare offsetting the low wage in the public sector. This paper develops an analysis framework of the regulatory failure on teacher＇s paid private tutoring, and also provide a new perspective on the widespread supervision malfunction