高管股权激励、产权性质与投资现金流敏感性

Equity Incentive, Property Rights and Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity

利用沪深A股制造业上市公司2007～2014年的财务数据,实证检验管理层股权激励对投资—现金流敏感性的影响,以及高管股权激励的治理效应在不同产权性质企业中的差异。研究发现,总体上,相对于未实施股权激励的企业而言,实施股权激励能够显著抑制企业的投资—现金流敏感性,且股权激励力度越大,抑制效果越显著。在投资不足行为中,股权激励对投资—现金流敏感性的抑制更加有效。进一步研究发现,与民营企业相比,国有企业股权激励对投资—现金流敏感性的影响更显著。

Using the financial data of manufacturing listed companies in A shares during 2007-2014, this paper tests the effects of executives equity incentive on investment cash flow sensitivity, and the differences of executives equity incentive effect among different property rights.The study shows that with respect to the companies without equity incentive, the implementation of equity incentive can significantly inhibit enterprise investment cash flow sensitivity, and the greater the equity incentive strength, the stronger the inhibition is. Equity incentive can restrict investment cash flow sensitivity on the under-investment behavior. Further study finds that compared with private enterprises, equity incentive effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity is more pronounced in the state-owned enterprises.