关联分析师荐股、基金持股与投资者利益

Affiliated Analysts＇ Recommendations, Fund Behavior and Investor Interests

本文通过将受雇于基金公司控股股东或发起人的分析师与这些基金公司进行配对，研究这种雇佣关联的分析师荐股和基金持股之间的交互行为及其对投资者利益的影响。研究发现，分析师荐股评级是非独立的，存在为基金持股服务的行为，并且与基金公司有雇佣关联的分析师和声誉低的分析师的独立性更差。这些与基金公司具有关联关系的分析师在以下行为中表现得更为明显：分析师倾向于对基金公司已持有的股票发布更强的推荐，而基金公司则在分析师的推荐发布后显著减少该股票的持股数量。另外，虽然投资者按分析师荐股可以获得正的超额收益，但是分析师和基金的雇佣关联依然会负向影响投资者的利益。

This paper studies the relationship between stock recommendation by the financial analysts and holding behavior of funds, especially, for those analysts who in employment relation- ship with majority-shareholder of funds. The study finds that analysts＇ rating on stock is not inde-pendent; the analysts in employment relationship with majority-shareholder of funds and with low reputation reveal worse independence. Specifically, analysts tend to release more optimal rating on stocks that have been hold by the funds~ the funds tend to significantly reduce the volume of the stocks in their portfolio once the analysts have announced the recommendations on the stocks. In addition, from the point of abnormal return, analysts in employment relationship with majority- shareholder of funds and with low reputation damage the interests of common investors.