摘要
亚里士多德的"灵魂"概念在哲学史上以及在当代心灵哲学中有着巨大的影响,但他的灵魂定义似乎包含着难以解决的问题。阿克里尔(J.Ackrill)在一篇著名的文章中指出,他的灵魂定义包含着逻辑矛盾,并且与他的质料形式理论不一致。本文重新梳理了阿克里尔的论证,归纳和评价了亚里士多德学界对这个问题的两种主要解决方案,并提供了对灵魂定义问题的一个新解释。这个新解释表明亚里士多德的灵魂定义没有逻辑矛盾;定义项中的"身体"代表的是"第二潜在性"。"灵魂"概念是一个目的概念和原因概念,即灵魂是从质料之中发展出来的,它就是身体的目的和完善性,它是一切生命活动的本原。因此,亚里士多德的心灵哲学跟一切与物理主义相兼容的当代心灵哲学理论是不相容的。
Aristotle's concept of soul has an enormous impact on the history of philosophy and on the contemporary philosophy of mind,but his definition of soul seems to involve logical inconsistency as well as inconsistency with his theory of form and material substance,as John Ackrill has pointed out in a famous essay. This paper articulates Ackrill's arguments,and gives a critical summary of the two dominant interpretations by scholars involved. It offers a new interpretation,arguing that there is no logical inconsistency in Aristotle's definition of soul since the body involved in the definition represents a second potentiality,and his concept of soul refers to the concept of end and that of cause,that is,soul originates from material substance,and is the end and completion of the body as well as the cause of all activities of life. Thus,Aristotle's philosophy of mind is incompatible with any contemporary philosophy of mind that is compatible with physicalism.
出处
《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》
北大核心
2016年第3期19-27,111,共9页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition
基金
2014年云南省哲学社会科学规划项目"亚里士多德心灵哲学研究"(项目号:QN2014013)的阶段性研究成果
