企业间专利组合收益分成的信号博弈策略

Signal Game Strategy on Patent Portfolio Revenue Sharing between Enterprises

利用信号博弈理论,对专利组合策略领导者存在逆向选择情况下的专利组合收益分成策略进行了规范性分析。主要结论如下:当专利组合策略的领导者有高素质与低素质两种类型时,若低素质领导者的模仿成本大于模仿收益,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率完全可以作为一种传递领导者类型的信号,此时的信号博弈存在一个序列分离均衡;反之,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率的信号传递作用将减弱以至不存在,此时的信号博弈存在一个混合策略均衡或混同均衡。最后,从实践角度给出了对策和建议。

By using the signal game theory,this paper analyzes the patent portfolio revenue sharing strategy of enterprises when there is the adverse selection of the leader of patent portfolio strategy.The main conclusion are as follows：the revenue sharing ratio can be regarded as a signal which represents the type of patent portfolio leader,and there exists a sequence separated equilibrium in the process of signal game when the imitation cost of patent portfolio leader with low quality type are more than imitation profits;whereas,the signal effect of revenue sharing ratio will be weaken even does not exist;at the same time,there is a mixed strategy equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium.Finally,it presents some practical countermeasures and suggestions.