摘要
公司高管薪酬本为降低代理成本、激励高管的工具,但实践中高管日益扩大的权力破坏了董事会作为利益冲突隔离机制的有效性,造成高管薪酬脱离业绩和高管自定薪酬现象严重。股东对公司高管薪酬投票是股东民主应有之义,股东大会是股东对公司高管进行投票控制的主要平台。在高管薪酬规制方面,多数市场经济发达国家实行了各具特色的股东对高管薪酬投票表决措施。我国应当参照其他国家的经验,建立相应的公司高管薪酬的股东投票制度:投票对象包括未来高管薪酬政策和上年度高管薪酬政策实施情况;股东对高管薪酬政策的投票具有约束力,对上年度高管薪酬政策实施情况的投票具有建议性;公司立法应该明确规定股东对高管薪酬投票的强制性。
Executive compensation is a means to reduce agency costs and to motivate company executives. In practice however,the ever- expanding powers of executives destroy the effectiveness of corporate board as a mechanism to manage conflicts of interest. This further leads to the lack of pay- performance association and self- determination of remuneration by company executives. In this respect,in line with an increasing trend of shareholder democracy,many developed market economies have introduced various forms of shareholder vote on executive remuneration. This paper argues that China should establish its own system of Say on Pay by mandating a binding shareholder vote on proposed executive remuneration policy for current financial year and a non- binding vote on the implementation of the policy for past year through company legislation.
出处
《比较法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期30-46,共17页
Journal of Comparative Law
关键词
高级管理人员
薪酬
股东投票
控制
company executives
remuneration
Say on Pay
control