独立董事本地任职提升了企业投资效率吗--基于中国资本市场A股上市公司2007-2013年的经验证据

Can Local Tenure of Independent Directors Enhance Corporate Investment Efficiency——The Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Companies during2007-2013 of China's Capital Market

独立董事在中国资本市场中如何扮演保护投资者利益的角色备受关注。本文选择本地任职这一独特视角,以2007-2013年间A股上市公司为研究对象,使用投资现金流敏感度模型实证分析独立董事本地任职对企业投资效率的影响。研究表明:(1)总体上而言,独立董事本地任职显著降低了投资现金流敏感度,表现为促进了企业投资效率的提升;(2)进一步分组后发现,当独立董事存在政治关联、包含女性和所在企业为非国家控股时,本地任职的投资效率促进作用显著降低。这表明,本地任职提升了独立董事的监督作用,但这一作用的发挥受限于独立董事的特征和外部企业环境。本文从投资效率视角丰富了中国情境下独立董事任职有效性的相关研究。

How independent directors can play a role in investor protection of China＇s capital markets has attracted lots of attention. Selecting local tenure as a unique perspective and using A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as sample, this article applies investment-cash flow sensitivity model to analyze the influence of independent director＇ s local tenure on corporate investment efficiency. As the resuhs show, in general, independent director＇s local tenure decreases investment-cash flow sensitivity significantly, indicating the in- crease of investment efficiency. If the sample is divided into groups further, the promotion of local tenure on investment efficiency is smaller when there is political connection, female members among independent directors, or the enterprises are non-state-owned. The above outcomes manifest that local tenure facilitates supervisory function of independent directors, but the function is limited by characteristic of independent directors and corporate external environment. This article enriches the related research on the validity of independent director＇s office in Chinese context from investment efficiency aspect.