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博弈论专家的行为实验何以印证主流经济学——实验条件的控制与实验结果的差异性 被引量:5

Why Can the Behavior Experiments Directed by Game Theory Experts Confirm the Mainstream Economics:On the Control of Experimental Conditions and Corresponding Diversity of Experimental Outcomes
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摘要 实验结果往往受实验控制条件的影响,实验条件的设置不同导致了实验结果的差异性。很大程度上,正是由于构建了类似经济人的双盲设置,博弈论专家所得出的实验结果往往会印证现代主流经济学的思维逻辑和相关理论。同时,博弈论专家之所以严格控制实验条件并热衷于双盲试验,则主要与他们的知识结构和研究对象有关,他们偏好于检测受试者在给定博弈情境下的行为逻辑,甚至对干扰因素对实验结果的影响感到不安。问题是,这种实验条件控制主要与有大量人员参与市场竞争行为比较相符,而与人们的日常生活情形相差巨大。因此,为了更好地通过实验来探索人们日常生活中的一般行为机理,就需要且可以改变实验条件,如博弈的矩阵类型、环境结构、受试者特性以及动态特性等,从而使得实验的博弈情境尽可能地接近现实环境,这是实验经济学和行为经济学的基本要求和发展方向。 The experimental outcomes are usually influenced by controlled experimental conditions.It is the different design of experimental conditions that leads to the diversity of experimental outcomes.To a large extent,because of the construction of double-blind settings that is similar with economic man,the experimental results achieved by game theory experts usually confirm the thinking logic and corresponding theories of modern mainstream economics. At the same time,knowledge structure of game theory experts and study objects contribute to the phenomenon that game theory experts tend to control experimental conditions strictly and are keen on double-blind settings. Generally,game theory experts prefer to test subjects' behavioral logic in the given game context,and even feel uneasy about the effects of some interference factors on the experimental results. However,this kind of controlled experimental condition is usually suitable to the market competition behavior where a large number of persons participate in,but is dramatically different from the situations of people's daily life. Therefore,in order to explore the general behavior mechanism in people's daily life better through behavioral experiments,it is necessary to improve the experiment conditions such as the matrix type of the game,environmental structure,subject characteristics and dynamics,so that the game context of experiments will be as close as possible to the real environment,which is the basic requirement and development direction of experimental and behavioral economics.
作者 朱富强
出处 《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期16-25,共10页 Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金 广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目"制度分析的方法论比较及其实践效应"(GD12CLJ02)
关键词 条件控制 博弈论 经济人 实验经济学 行为经济学 controlled condition game theory economic man experimental economics behavioral economics
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参考文献48

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