央地财政关系:协调失灵与地方政府财政赤字扩张偏向

Central?local Fiscal Relationship:Coordination Failure and Fiscal Deficit Expansion Bias of Local Governments

文章基于央地财政关系协调失灵导致地方财政赤字扩张偏向的理论假设和现实背景,通过构建一个协调博弈理论模型,运用我国1995-2012年省级空间面板数据模型的GS2SLS和System GMM的回归分析,系统研究了"央地财政关系"对地方政府财政赤字扩张偏向的影响机制。研究发现:我国地方政府存在财政赤字决策的相互模仿行为,中央政府存在通过财政协调机制来协调地方政府的财政决策行为,但并不成功。这意味着我国"央地财政关系"确实存在协调失灵,进而导致地方政府财政赤字持续膨胀的经济现象。

Based on the theoretical hypothesis that coordination failure of central-local fiscal relationship leads to fiscal deficit expansion bias of local governments and the reality background,this paper constructs a coordination game theory model,and uses the regression analysis of GS2 SLS and System GMM of provincial spatial panel data model from 1995 to 2012to systematically study the mechanism of the effect of central-local fiscal relationship on fiscal deficit expansion bias of local governments.It comes to the conclusions as follows：there is mutually imitation behavior of local governments in terms of fiscal deficit decision-making,and the central government actually coordinates fiscal deficit decisionmaking behavior of local governments by fiscal coordination mechanism,but it has not been a success.It means that there is really a coordination failure of Chinese central-local fiscal relationship,thereby resulting in the economic phenomenon of constant fiscal deficit expansion of local governments.