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国际商业利益与东道国生产商的外资政策偏好 被引量:4

International Commercial Interests and Manufacturers' Policy Preferences on IFDI
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摘要 如同贸易和商品的跨国流动,资本的全球配置和生产的全球化同样具有重要的国内政治影响。以对外直接投资对东道国生产商的影响为例,通过增加生产要素的需求和产品的供给,外资的进入会像商品进口一样增加东道国生产商所面临的竞争压力。因此,在不存在其他限制性因素的情况下,面临外部竞争压力的东道国生产商会像反对商品进口一样反对相同产业外资的流入。然而,关于20世纪80年代以来美国半导体、可再生能源和钢铁产业生产商对外来投资立场的分析表明,东道国生产商是否主张对外来投资进行限制或采取歧视性政策,受到它们在外资来源国商业利益规模的显著影响。将国际商业利益与生产商外资政策偏好相联系的机制是开放和保护国内投资市场所带来的收益与成本之间的变化,而导致成本和收益发生变化的一个重要因素是外资来源国的潜在反应。具体而言,当生产商与外资来源国存在较大规模的商业利益时,该生产商对来自该国的直接投资就越可能持开放的政策偏好;相反,当生产商在外资来源国的商业利益规模较小时,其对来自该国的直接投资就越可能持抵制的政策偏好。 Just like the transnational flow of trade and goods,the global allocation of capital and the globalization of production have important influences on domestic politics. Taking the foreign direct investment on the manufacturers in the host country for instance,by increasing the demand of production factors and the supply of products,inward foreign direct investment( IFDI) increases the competitive pressure faced by manufacturers just as imports of goods does. As a result,manufacturers would lobby against IFDI as they usually demanding for the protection from import of goods,if without other constraints. However,an analysis of U.S. semiconductors,renewable energy,and steel industries since 1980 s indicates that,whether manufacturers looking for the restriction of or discrimination against certain IFDI is significantly influenced by the scale of their commercial interests in the home country of FDI. Specifically,the manufacturers with larger scale of international commercial interests will be more likely to favor policies of openness,the manufactures with little international commercial interests will more likely prefer restrictive or discriminatory policies against IFDI.
作者 吴其胜
出处 《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期131-155,160,共25页 World Economics and Politics
基金 国家社科基金青年项目"中国对美投资摩擦的政治化及对策研究"(项目编号:15CGJ017)的阶段性成果
关键词 外来直接投资 国际商业利益 生产商 外资政策偏好 IFDI international commercial interest manufacturers policy preference
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