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CEO接班人遴选机制与CEO变更后公司风险承担研究——基于CEO接班人年龄的视角 被引量:15

An Empirical Study on Mechanism of CEO Successor Selection and Its Implication on Corporate Risk-taking:Based on the Perspective of CEO Successor's Age
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摘要 将CEO接班人的年龄作为其认知特征、价值观的重要体现,本文研究了董事会成员遴选CEO接班人的决策机制并进一步从年龄的视角分析了CEO变更后公司风险承担问题。以1998至2011年发生CEO变更的中国A股上市公司作为样本,运用OLS回归模型和工具变量回归模型,本文检验了董事会成员年龄变化和CEO接班人年龄变化之间的关系及CEO接班人年龄变化对CEO变更后公司风险承担的影响。研究结果发现:CEO接班人年龄与公司董事会成员的年龄显著正相关;CEO接班人年龄与CEO变更后公司风险承担水平反方向变化。本文的理论分析和研究结果拓展了关于CEO变更前置因素和影响后果的理论研究,同时对企业如何在遴选出合适与公司发展的CEO接班人以使公司承担适度风险实现转型升级、自主创新同时避免财务困境具有重要的现实指导意义。 In terms of CEO successor's age,the paper investigates the factors that affect CEO's selection and the mechanism underlying the process. Additionally,we examine corporate risk-taking following CEO succession and how it is related to CEO successor's age. In the Chinese firms where CEO succession occurred between 1998 and 2011,by exploring IV regression model,we find CEO successor's age changes with board age to the same direction; the change of CEO successor's age is negatively related to the change of corporate risk-taking following the succession. Our further test confirms that the gap between CEO successor's age and that of board give rise to the increase in likelihood of directors' leaving and decrease of firms performance after succession. Our theoretical analysis and empirical evidence not only further the understanding of the process and outcome of CEO succession,but also bear practical meaning in improving efficiency of CEO succession and encouraging firm shoulder reasonable risk to innovate without getting into financial crisis.
作者 刘鑫 薛有志
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第5期137-149,共13页 Management Review
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372092) 自然科学青年基金项目(71402015)
关键词 CEO接班人 年龄 董事会成员 公司风险承担 CEO successor age directors corporate risk-taking
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