高需求状态下交通BOT项目特许决策模型

A Decision-Making Model of Concession for Traffic BOT Projects under High Demand

近年来,BOT融资模式在交通基础设施项目领域得到了广泛应用。但随着经济发展和交通量的激增,许多交通BOT项目投资方获得了暴利并严重损害了社会公平。本文以实现消费者剩余最大化与项目公司收益最大化为决策目标,构建了在消费者意愿支付的价格大于政府确定的价格上限的高需求状态下,交通BOT项目特许期与收费价格的完全信息动态博弈模型,在考虑政府限价政策的作用下,运用逆向归纳法求解出高需求状态下的最优特许期和收费价格,从而为交通BOT项目的前期谈判提供决策参考。

In recent years,BOT（ build-operate-transfer） arrangement has been widely applied for public utilities and infrastructure construction projects around the world,especially in the field of transportation infrastructure,which could relieve the government＇s financial burden and improve operating efficiency. But with the development of economy and a surge of traffic,many investors of the transportation BOT projects have gain huge profits,which seriously damage the social fairness. Aiming at the realization of maximizing the consumer surplus and the net revenue of project companies,this paper constructs a complete information dynamic game model of concession period and toll for BOT projects under high demand,which means that consumers would like to pay more than the price cap determined by government. Under the conditions of high demand and governmental toll controls,backward induction is carried out to derive the optimized concession period and toll. And further,it analyses the properties of the decision results. Finally,the proposed model is illustrated by a numerical example. The proposed decision mechanism can not only avoid the project companies to reap huge profits,but also maintain investment enthusiasm of them. Therefore,it may provide scientific decision-making reference for both the government and private sector in initial negotiation period for BOT projects.