盖梯尔后的认知运气问题研究——知识与运气何以相容?

Epistemic Luck After Gettier:How Could Knowledge Be Compatible With Luck?

盖梯尔之后的哲学家对知识定义的修正集中于试图排除运气,因为他们认为知识与运气是不相容的,运气所具有的偶然性会摧毁知识。对于认知运气的说明,哲学家们从模态和不受控等角度进行了描述。在可错主义的基础上,沿着排除认知运气这一路径,各种解决盖梯尔问题的方案相继被给出,比如无错误根据理论、无本质性的错误根据理论和因果理论。一方面这些方案都成功排除了部分认知运气,另一方面它们还是不能避免其他认知运气。哲学家们逐渐认识到,如果我们坚持运气与知识是不相容的,就会使人类陷于一无所知的境地。因此,知识必定要与某些运气相容,比如命题性运气、存在性运气、能力性运气和证据性运气,而真理性运气则是与知识不相容的。

After Gettier,philosophers focus on precluding luck in their rectification and refinement of the definition of knowledge,because in their opinions,luck is incompatible with knowledge,and the accidental nature of luck will destroy knowledge in the roots. With regard to the explication of epistemic luck,epistemologists mainly give their accounts in the view of modality or a state out of control. Adhering to Fallibilism,in the approach of ruling out epistemic luck,philosophers have come up with many solutions to the Gettier Problem,such as the theory of No False Grounds,the theory of No Essential False Grounds and the Causal Theory of Knowing. On the one hand,these approaches have managed to get rid of some kind of luck; on the other hand,they can＇t avoid other kinds of luck. Some philosophers advocate that knowledge must be compatible with some kinds of luck,such as propositional luck,existential luck,facultative luck and evidential luck. Only veritic luck is incompatible with knowledge.