基于出口国偏好的天然气进口策略

Natural Gas Import Strategy Based on Exporter Preference

针对我国天然气进口量日益增加以及天然气出口国存在出口偏好等现象,利用微分对策模型,研究出口国的出口偏好对天然气进口国之间的竞争以及对最优进口量策略的影响。研究表明,出口国对进口国的偏好最强时,随预期进口量和进口天然气的贴现率增加,进口国的最优进口量增加,进口量的最大可能值与天然气最低交易价格成正比与价格增长率成反比。随出口国偏好增加和其它进口国的预期进口量降低,进口国最优进口量增加。当出口国对进口国偏好很弱时,进口国达到预期进口需求量所需时间变长。

Aimed at the phenomenon that there is increase in imports of natural gas in China and exporters have preferences for exporting,this paper studies the influence of exporter preference on the competition between natural gas importers and the optimal import policy by differential game.It has been found that when the exporter preferences on the importer is strong,the increase in expected imports and discount rate of importer lead to the increase in the optimal imports of importer,and the limit value of imports is proportional to the lowest gas price and inversely proportional to the price growth.With the increase of exporter preference and the decrease of expect imports of other importer,the optimal imports of importer increase.When the preference of exporter on the importer is very weak,the time,when the demand gap of natural gas has been fully filled,will become long.