“限薪令”对企业内部薪酬差距激励效果的影响研究

Research on the Incentive Effect of“Government-Imposed Pay Curbs”to Pay Gap in Listed State-Owned Enterprises

基于我国沪深上市公司2007-2012年的年度非平衡面板数据,笔者就政府"限薪令"对国有控股企业内部薪酬差距激励效果的影响进行了甄别。研究结果表明,国有控股企业的内部薪酬差距与绩效之间存在倒U型关系。当薪酬差距较小时,适当扩大薪酬差距可激励管理层和员工的努力水平从而提升企业绩效,但这种激励效果会随薪酬差距的扩大而减小。政府"限薪令"的实施没有对内部薪酬差距的激励效果产生影响。对于垄断性行业的国有控股企业,内部薪酬差距与绩效不存在显著关联关系,"限薪令"对这类企业内部薪酬差距激励效果的影响不明显。

Using an unbalanced panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2012, this paper examines the incentive effects＇of pay gap between execut：：es and employees in listed state-owned enterprises and the impacts of ＂Government-imposed pay curbs＂ on the incentive effects. The results show that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between pay gap and the performance in listed state-owned enterprises. When the pay gap is less,enlarging of pay gap will stimulate the executives and the employees to work harder and improve performance,but the incentive effect of pay gap decreases as the pay gap becomes larger. ＂Government-imposed pay curbs＂ has no significant influence on the incentive effects of pay gap. Furthermore, pay gap is not significantly related to performance in the state- owned monopoly enterprises and ＂Government-imposed pay curbs＂ has no influence on the incentive effect of pay gap in these monopoly enterprises.