摘要
基于业主与承包商的博弈模型,从一次和多次博弈两方面剖析了大型水利工程中承包商信用缺失动机的形成机理,并根据行为心理学理论分析信用风险的形成路径。结果表明:强监督力度、强惩罚力度、适度奖励是有效控制承包商信用风险的途径。在此基础上建立信用风险的动态管理机制,为大型水利工程中的信用风险系统管理提供参考。
Based on the game model for the employer and contractor,the formation mechanism of the motivation for the contractor 's lack of credit in large-scale water conservancy projects is analyzed from the aspects of one-time game and multiple-time game,and the formation path of credit risk is discussed according the theoretical analysis of behavioral psychology. The results show that strong supervision,strong punishment and moderate reward are the effective approach to pre-control the credit risk brought by the contractor. On this basis,a dynamic management mechanism for credit risk is established so as to provide systematic countermeasures for the credit risk of large-scale water conservancy projects.
出处
《水利经济》
2016年第3期13-15,20,共4页
Journal of Economics of Water Resources
关键词
大型水利工程
信用风险
形成路径
动态管理机制
large-scale water conservancy project
credit risk
formation path
dynamic management mechanism